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Introduction
The parent paper has been written and submitted for fulfilling the requirements and
purpose  of  dissertation's  elaboration  for  postgraduate  programme  in  «Energy  Law,
Business, Regulation and Policy 2015-2016» at International Hellenic University (IHU).
The discussed topic  is  the following:  “Water-Energy Nexus,  Putting Pieces Together:
Critical Review And Perspectives”.
The scope of  this  paper  is  not  to  be another  general  introduction to water-energy
concept for newcomers to this subject, neither to be a collection of frequently asked
questions and answers for every single aspect of nexus.
On the contrary, targets on providing the theoretical framework along with examples
from  literature  and  world  practices  in  topics  that  are  crucial  for  a  more  effective
governance  of  nexus  while  providing  useful  insights  for  research,  business
opportunities and investments.
Fact  that  was  not  an easy  task,  when considering  both  that  nexus  is  progressively
elevating from an operational tool to a new joint-resource management paradigm and
that is described by complexity which entails the ability to carry out in-depth research
in multi-disciplinary fields, while exhibiting analytical and synthetic critical thinking.
Moreover, the parent thesis aims in originality by involving features for which there is
not any extended literature in the context of nexus; and under the certain scope.
Nevertheless,  even  though  the  discussed  sub-subjects,  are:  conceptual  confusion,
implications  of  water  pricing,  game  theory,  transboundary  issues,  aspects  of
technology  and green infrastructures,  the view is  much wider;  like  including data's
validity,  trade-offs,  distributional  justice,  cooperation,  stakeholders'  engagement,
unanticipated consequences of technology and obstacles in investments.
In  order  to  succeed  integration  of  all  above  within  the  frame  of  easy  accessing
information, the structure and sectioning of the parent paper has been made in both a
linear and non-linear way.
In particular, the paper is being divided in two unequal in extent parts, which are being
followed by the conclusions. The reason of the imbalance in parts' length is, the fact
that technology and infrastructures are being used supplementary, in order to further
incorporate  interests  of  business  sector  and  investors;  not  to  be  an  engineering
manual. The first  part is developed around various issues of nexus governance, but
from  a  more  water-centric  view.  The  second  one  is  orientated  around  the  green
infrastructures' investments, with a more nature-centric view.
More analytically, for part one.
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In chapter “Setting The Context Of Water-Energy Nexus”, the notion of Nexus is briefly
being  historically  inspected  up  to  today  in  relation  to  resource's  management  and
public policies.
In chapter “Conceptual Confusion In Nexus Context”, is mainly being illustrated how a
concept  that  initially  developed  by  political  scientists  for  describing  concept
misinformation in comparative politics, can apply as it is or adjusted in nexus along
with the produced effects.
In chapter  “Implications Of Water's Pricing”, is being discussed the need for water's
appropriate pricing and if – under the main drivers (e.g. security) that necessitate such
pricing – distributional justice has been put in secondary position. Also, a preliminary
attempt to inspect reflection of water's pricing in datasets.
In chapter  “Game Theory In Service Of Nexus”,  is  being exhibited the usefulness of
game theory in the service of nexus, how it could help in stakeholders' engagement
and how methods that do not integrate its advantages in providing solutions could at
best  generate  large  amount  of  information  that  is  not  easily  managed  and  might
complicate interpretation.
In chapter  “In Transboundary  Basin Level”,  the concept  of  nexus is  being deployed
across dimension of basin level between upstream and downstream of river,  littoral
states; around the determinant of cooperation. Complementary to nexus, is considered
the contribution of IWRM and international legal regime.
More analytically, for part two.
Chapter “Technologies and Nexus” mainly operates as a medium in between nexus and
green  infrastructure,  by  exhibiting  the  concept  of  unanticipated  consequences  of
technology (e.g. water intensive energy technologies) in projects' competitiveness due
to  separated  consideration  of  technological  solutions in  a  “silo”  approach  of  nexus
components.
In chapter  “Natural Infrastructures On Nexus”, is being discussed whether there is a
coincidence of  interests  of concerned parts  involved on green infrastructures,  what
kind of  benefits  does  this  kind of  infrastructures  do provide and inspect  some key
elements of investing on them.
Finally, in the conclusions – based on the reasoning of above chapters – the key issues
are  being  highlighted  and  some  suggestions  are  being  made;  intending  to  benefit
decision  and  policy  makers  to  better  understand  the  concept  of  nexus  across
horizontal/vertical  scales  and  dimensions,  researchers  to  embrace  validity  of  their
research, help modelers to provide solutions that will be more stable and feasible, help
business  managers  to  make  the  connection  between  ecosystem's  services,  natural
resources coupling and the business bottom line.
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Part 1: Issues Of Nexus 
Governance
Not  all  issues  are  cross  sectoral  or  cross-disciplinary  (Davis,  2014).  As  also  not
necessarily  water  and energy  components  should  be  addressed all  together  in  the
framework of one single intervention (ADC, 2015). But when it comes to a holistic or
ecosystem approach of cross-sectoral interactions across scales and dimensions, then
all  involved parts  must  be aware of  the produced perplexities  as  described by the
“traveling problem”.
Moreover, nexus is not only a matter of natural resources' interdependencies but also
of  factors  like  population  growth,  affluence,  poverty  and  climate  change,  that  are
tacitly  forcing  stress  on  resources.  This  is  apparent  for  example  when  considering
published papers that connect nexus and various climate change aspects through game
theory  (Yang,  2008;  Hasson,  2009;   Kutasi,  2010;   Bosetti,  2012).  Generally,  the
involvement  of  game  theory  appears  appealing  due  to  the  fact  that  in  one  hand
operates complementary to computational models (Krause et al., 2006; Madani et al.,
2011; Pinto et al., 2013) while on the other hand can lead to stable solutions (Madani
et al., 2015a).
Of course resource coupling governance in order to be effective must be characterized
from  coherent,  stepwise  and  consultive  planning,  especially  in  cases  were  friction
occurs due to different states and legal regimes. Nexus approach in such cases does not
offer  many  normative  principles  (Benson  et  al.,  2015;  UNECE,  2015a).  Could
international law and/or IWRM contribute effectively in such cases of transboundary
management? What experience taught us when some or all riparian states are not part
of UN / ECE Water Conventions (like in case of Lower Mekong River)? These are some
important  questions  that  must  be  answered  in  relation  to  nexus.  Especially  when
considering  that  international  watercourses  approximately  cover  half  of  the  land
surface of the earth, account for 80% of global river flows and serve the livelihood of
about 40% of the world’s population (Wolf et al., 1999).
Thus,  this  section  will  be  focused  on  how  nexus  is  being  affected  by  conceptual
confusion,  the  influence  of  value  and  pricing  of  water  in  nexus,  the  game  theory
approach of nexus and the transboundary dimension. And by that will  be discussed
among others:
• data's reliability, validity and consistency
• stakeholders' and actors' engagement and consent
• clearly signaled externalities, pricing and markets
• role of sectoral and business levels
• local and geographic peculiarities in connection to global dimension.
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Finally, to be stated that despite in this section we stress a lot on water component of
nexus – as seems that many scholars did after water-centric perception of nexus as put
by Vonn2011 Conference (Hoff, 2011; Keskinen and Varis,  2016) – nevertheless this
does not operate against the energy component. On the contrary, not only energy is
constantly being discussed, but many times other components (e.g.  agriculture) are
being referenced additionally. Therefore, even if it is accepted that “water acts as a
state variable and at the same time a control variable of change, and is placed centrally
in the nexus” (Hoff, 2011), nevertheless this section is not considered as water-centric,
rather use water as a concrete ground and many times as a starting point to exhibit and
develop all above issues.
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Setting The Context Of Water-Energy Nexus
Despite that the nexus concept is rapidly and increasingly gaining attention globally in
research, business and policy making (Leck et al., 2015) – even though water-energy
nexus just suggested at the end of 1970s (Bishop and Mirayanan, 1979) and water-
energy-food (WEF) even later (Weatherfold and Ingram, 1984) – nonetheless, still today
there is no single strictly clear definition acceptable by everyone (Benson et al., 2015;
De Strasser, 2016).
This certain degree of freedom in setting the actual context of nexus, could provide
more flexibility in notions with such complexity but also might produce perplexities and
induce imprecise conclusions.
For  example  in  terms of  management  and policy-making,  the scope of  nexus  is  to
(Dubois et al., 2014; Howells and Rogner, 2014):
• move towards a more coordinated management and use of natural resources
across  sectors  and  scales  (Welsh  et  al,  2014;  Dale  et  al.,  2015;  Fulton  and
Cooley; 2015);
• identify and manage trade-offs;
• build synergies (Mekong River Commission, 2012; Benson et al., 2013b);
• shift towards a more integrated and cost-effective planning, decision-making,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation; while maintaining the integrity of
ecosystems (Mekong River Commission, 2012).
While, considering sustainability notion, resource scarcity and the balancing between
resource user goals and interests, can be said that nexus concept is in the same vein to
management  and  policy-making  debate  that  triggered  at  the  early  1970s  –  same
decade when first water-energy nexus conceived – by the publication of “The Limits To
The Growth”. To be noticed that in nexus, it is not necessarily the physical amount of
such resources that cause them to be globally scarce but more likely how the access is
governed along with the allocation and use of  resources;  even though shortage  in
water  is probably  more serious than in energy in the not-that-far  future (Andrews-
Speed, 2012).  Hereon to be mentioned that despite the fact that water is not only
more  prone  to  scarcity  than  energy  but  also  more  fundamental  concerning  public
health, still concerning economy this relation turns to be reversed since in a scenario of
abundant and cheap energy the supply of water may be abundant and cheap (e.g.,
desalination) but not vice-versa in global terms (Ibáñez Martí, 2013). 
In reference to global terms, energy and water are also considered global resources.
This is because important energy resources are not evenly distributed in geographic
space (Rempel, 2006),  while power production is a significant contributer to carbon
emissions (Shalizi, 2007). Also, due to the fact that water is related to global demand
for food and other commodities through markets (Allan, 2011; Antonelli and Sartori,
2014;  Hoekstra,  2014).  Therefore,  in  addition  to  policy-making  scope  of  nexus  as
described  above,  the  dimension  of  global  governance  should  also  be  considered.
Under this prism and in connection to sustainable development, there is a growing
demand for  universal  goals  for  the post-2015 era (Brandi  et  al.,  2013);  albeit  with
differentiated targets and actions (Nilsson et al., 2013; Weitz et al.; 2014).
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Anyhow,  the  core  idea  behind  nexus  concept  is  to  incorporate  natural  resources'
management of those that are inextricably connected to water, energy, food, land and
climate security; through an integrated resource management approach.
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Conceptual Confusion In Nexus Context
At this  chapter,  will  mainly be illustrated how a concept that  initially developed by
political scientists for describing concept misinformation in comparative politics, can
apply as it is or adjusted in nexus along with the produced effects; while providing
examples where there is such need.
In general  “Traveling problem” describes conceptual  stretching,  when concepts and
categories are applied to new cases. If concepts are able to 'travel' then they apply to
large number of comparable cases, albeit not all concepts and categories are good at
traveling  (Caramani,  2009).  So  generally,  “traveling”  problem  describes  conceptual
confusion; and the importance of the latter in cross-disciplinary dialogues is considered
significant (Jacobsson and Jacobsson, 2014).
Not Like-For-Like Comparison
As stated above still today several definitions of nexus do variate (Benson et al., 2015;
De Strasser, 2016). However, according to scholars, three complementary perspectives
can be distinguished in relation to nexus notion (Keskinen and Varis, 2016; Keskinen et
al., 2016). These perspectives are attained when approaching nexus from the point of
view of analytical approach, governance framework and emerging discourse. The latter
force an obvious impact on cross level linkages.
Nevertheless, the absence of a single definition is not the base but the stem of the
problem. Causation partly could be traced in common shared features between nexus
and other resource management approaches (i.e. IWRM) – like integration,  optimal
governance,  scale,  participation,  resource use,  and sustainable  development  –  that
could result to conceptual confusion and problems to comparative analyses; since are
not being interpreted exactly the same (Harkness, 2011; Benson et al., 2015).
The comparison between features of nexus with those of IWRM, is really important
especially  after  United  Nations  Conference  on  Sustainable  Development  (UNCSD),
commonly  known  as  Rio+20,  according  to  which  the  formulation  of  Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) regarding water should be build upon the existing concepts
of  Integrated  Water  Resource  Management  (IWRM) and the human right  to  water
(Brandi et al., 2013); even though water (as energy also) was not explicitly included as
one of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Beside common features with IWRM, water consumption and various other metrics
(e.g.  water  withdrawal,  water  consumption,  water  utilization  etc.)  from  “water  to
energy”  literature,  in  principle  considered  to  be  valuable,  complementary  and
informative.  However,  are facing hard controversy because of their inconsistency in
their  interpretation,  so  that  their  application  has  resulted  in  incomparable  and
sometimes contradictory results (Madani and Khatami, 2015).
All above, are known as the “traveling problem” (Sartori, 1970; Harkness, 2011; Benson
et al., 2013), and potentially influence inferences. For example when perplexities are
produced  in  comparative  research  (and  thus  in  use  of  integrated  models)  that  is
attributed to a not like-for-like comparison (Madani and Khatami, 2015).
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Effect Of Perspectives, Objectives And Experience
Letting apart the many dimensions of one notion, similar imprecise conclusions could
be inherited either by different perspectives on knowledge management or because of
varying levels of experience and different objectives (Delong and Seemann, 2000). 
So the effect of “traveling problem” and various perspectives could also be identified in
different organizational level of decision and policy making.
The issue of many dimensions of a concept could be apparent even when considering
viewpoints that could come from same or equivalent organizational level(s) (Delong
and  Seemann,  2000).  For  example,  when  trying  to  tackle  nexus  trade-offs,  one
approach could be that of capturing best practices trough a shared database (ACEEE,
2011; IEA and WBCSD, 2014) and another approach is to stress on local peculiarities.
Stressing on local peculiarities could be more useful in cases of states/territories/areas
with the need to  cope primarily  with particular  components  of  Water-Energy-Food
nexus, like:
• water-energy,
e.g in Praia of Capo Verde (ADC, 2015; MTIDE, 2015) or post-2014 Gaza Strip
(IMF, 2014; ADC, 2015; UNRWA, 2016);
• or, water-agriculture,
e.g in Burkina Faso (ADC, 2015; ODI, 2015).
'Pseudo-“Traveling”' Problem
Another  example  is  related  to  critical  consideration  of  both  horizontal  and  vertical
scales and of dimensions (Leese and Meisch, 2015; Endo et al.,  2015; Keskinen and
Varis, 2016). In particular, synergies, could be perceived as (Leese and Meisch, 2015):
• horizontal cross sectoral;
• vertical among different levels of administrative authorities,
i.e. international, national, regional, local;
• or, across spatial boundaries,
e.g. transboundary, basin-wide.
Furthermore, the “traveling” problem could be connected – and not attributed – to
nexus management and public policy through different perspectives on management
models as matter of a top-down or bottom-up approach. For example, if public policy is
practiced in terms of a top-down technocratic instead of a bottom-up participatory
approach then it  could potentially  encapsulate  the contingency  of  narrowing down
public audience; and as so, narrowing down the potential for multilaterally and fully
implementing  the  aforementioned  synergies  at  same  time.  This  could  be  because
leaders of top-down schemes consider that other than key actors – such as street level
bureaucrats or local implementing officials – could lead whole endeavour to bottleneck
and therefor strategic initiatives coming from them are being neglected (Elmore, 1979;
Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Hanf, 1982; Hjern and Hull, 1982; Sabatier, 1986). While even
if the leader of top-down scheme exhibits the willingness to engage the capacity of
other actors, there still might be problem when the technocratic approach requires a
highly technical understanding of role of evidence in policy (Hoppe, 2011; Hajer and
Wagenaar, 2003).
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So  in  practice  vertical  cross  section  synergies  could  not  successfully  been  fully
implemented.  Thus,  could  be  said  that  potentially  the  preference  on  management
model could lead to a situation of a 'pseudo-“traveling” problem' not by direct choice
but by the developments. So there must be a balance between a top-down or bottom-
up approach at the point where endeavour considered to be viable.
Summary
Summarizing, we illustrated that despite “traveling” problem is a concept borrowed
from political sciences – along with conceptual confusion in general – nevertheless the
implications  cannot  be  neglected  and  are  well  spread  over  policy-making,
organizational governance, even on comparative analysis.
Initially, illustrated how the need for escaping from stagnated situation caused by the
lack of adequate datasets, nexus research is phasing out to use of sketchy data, metrics
with inconsistencies in their interpretation and shared notions (i.e. with IWRM) that do
not have exactly the same content.  Thence, in a not like-for-like comparison, which
might influence inferences and produce perplexities in comparative research, that will
eventually be inherited in policy-making procedure.
Also, illustrated that different perspectives:
• depending on knowledge management,
• based on experience level, and
• derived from different objectives
are affecting synergies, practices and policy-making. Fact that could be apparent both
on different and same or equivalent organizational level(s).
Finally, the concept of 'pseudo-“traveling” problem' was introduced and developed, as
a direct result of different perspectives on management models as a matter of top-
down and bottom-up approaches.
-9-
Implications Of Water's Pricing
Today, the prevailed choice in water's pricing reform by policymakers mainly focused
on household water use and partly to agricultural. But how price and value of water is
connected to nexus? Are there “Market-Based Mechanisms” (MBMs), and if so, are
they widely-spread and how well do they integrate distributional justice. Also, what's
the connection of MBMs with “Virtual Water Trade” (VWT) concept or with adequacy
of datasets. These are the main question that will be answered in this chapter; so to
help policy-makers and highlight issues around emerging business opportunities; which
are attributed to securitization of sustainable economy.
Importance Of Appropriate Pricing
From Adam Smith's “diamond-water paradox” (Smith, 1776), through idea of valuing
only natural assets we own (Leopold and Schwartz, 1949), until today's “peak water”
concept (Gleick and Palaniappan; 2010) – which still considered to be premature, even
though there is an extensive literature on peak oil, years now – the value and pricing of
water does not necessarily coincide; thus not only interfering with safety and security
of water but also influencing the water-energy nexus.
This influence – in conjunction with the consideration according to which there are
cases around the world where water rights tend to define right to use water but not to
assign ownership of the entire stock of water leading to a situation where, in general,
water tends to be over-used (Brady and Yoder, 2013) or water not efficiently marketed
because of non well-defined transferable property rights (Frederick, 1998) – signifies
the importance of water's appropriate pricing in water-energy nexus.
Besides, there is a genuine need for nexus components to be commodified so that to
provide a harnessed and manageable basis  for  the green economy as envisaged to
operate  under  the  paradigm  of  security  (National  Intelligence  Council,  2012;  2030
Water Resources Group, 2009; Leese and Meisch, 2015). Moreover, appropriate pricing
can ensure that the environmental externalities of using natural resources and services
are clearly signaled (EC et al., 2012). Else, in case of water availability below its fair or
appropriate price, not only the water is being wasted (Gabaldon, 2012; Chebly, 2014)
but also operates as an obstacle to a more efficient use of it (Prager, 2006; Chebly,
2014). Towards the direction of internalizing impact, the determinant for establishing
monitoring systems to track and monitor nexus components and indexes (Bonn2011
Conference, 2012) could operate auxiliary.
Market-Based Mechanisms (MBMs)
In recognition to the aforementioned genuine need, MBMs are already been deployed
for allocating water and cost recovery – mainly concerning irrigation – (Easter and Liu,
2005; OECD, 2009) or more general like in USA (Frederick 1998; DOI's USBR, 2009);
though it's not an easy endeavour (Johansson, 2000; Donohew, 2009).
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Versus Virtual Water Trade (VWT)
To be noticed that water's MBMs should not be confused with what is called as VWT,
since  the  value  of  virtual  water  is  as  economically  invisible  and  silently  resolved
through food market  as  economically  invisible  and politically  silent  is  virtual  water
(Allan, 2011); even though, par example, on global average an imported/exported ton
of wheat  has been associated with 1300 cubic  meters of  free water  (Antonelli  and
Sartori,  2014; Hoekstra,  2014).   Nevertheless,  VWT concept is connected to several
constraints such as: land availability, self-sufficiency instead of food security as a choise
of national policy, disambiguation between green and blue water.  Additionally,  VWT
faced controversial critics by economists, although could explain consumption indirect
effects that might be externalized to other countries through freshwater globalization
(Antonelli and Sartori, 2014).
Distributional Justice And Other Argues
Of course, not all scholars' views about market-trade contribution are considered as
optimistic.  In  particular  there  is  the  so  called  “Three  Weddings  and  Avoiding  Two
Funerals”  idea,  according  to  which,  economic  diversification,  socio-economic
development and trade in enabling environments and sustainable economies (the third
“wedding”) – along with water form energy and energy from water (first and second
“wedding”) – will not deterministically help society to avoid depletion and degradation
of  environmental  services  of  water  (first  “funeral”)  and  (as  second  “funeral”  the)
impairment of atmosphere (Allan, 2009). In order to be avoided must, both shifting
from  conventional  energy  to  renewable  and  change  in  consumers  and  producers
mentality, take place (ibid). But, to the latter could be said that the concept of value
and pricing of water could probably help in mindsets' shift. Position that appears to be
also accepted by the man that introduced the aforementioned idea; according some
given lecture at the University of Saskatchewan at 2009 (Grzybowski, 2010).
Anyway,  Foucault  since  1977-78,  already  showed  that  there  is  an  inextricable  link
between security and the economy (Foucault  et al.,2007; Leese and Meisch, 2015).
However, there is a long debate whether distributional justice being put in secondary
position while “energy and food have been placed on top of the security agenda in
order to push forward solutions to economic pressures” (Leese and Meisch,  2015).
Contradictory  answers,  are  being  given  by  scholars,  arguing  on  whether  emerging
opportunities for business and “marketisation” of green governance, is for survival of
mankind or for the preservation of current  economic setups (ibid).  At  this  point,  is
noted the need for further research, since the dominant argumentation – like in carbon
economy – stress on comparing neo-liberalism's perception with others.
Reflection Of Water Pricing In Datasets
Another point that should be aware of, is that water pricing maybe reflected in the
absence of adequate datasets;  i.e. of data on actual  water  consumption for energy
systems (GAO 2009, Mielke et al.,  2010; Macknick et al.,  2011; Spang et al.,  2014).
Nevertheless, water use in agriculture is more documented (Siebert, 2010; Hoekstra,
2012; Steduto, 2012) and data are less sketchy. The aforementioned – within the lack
of a standard framework for assessing and measuring the water  impacts of energy
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(Madani  and  Hadian,  2013)  –  could  enhance  biased  interchangeable  use  of  some
metrics as mentioned during “travelling problem”.
So despite that energy economics may be amongst dominant components of driving
developments  in  water-energy  nexus  (Gold  and  Bass,  2010),  nevertheless  water
economics implications cannot be neglected.
Summary
Summarizing, some reasons for appropriate water's pricing, are:
• value and price of water does not coincide,
• connection of economy and security,
• situations where water tend to be overused as a result of water defind rights,
• to  ensure  that  environmental  externalities  of  using  natural  resources  and
services are clearly signaled,
• to provide harnessed and manageable basis for green economy
To this effect, some MBMs within nexus concept have already been deployed, though
it's not an easy endeavour. And by referring to mechanisms, do not mean the so called
VWT; which is connected to several constraints, while being economically invisible and
politically silent.
Going back to MBMs, not all scholars are taking a favorable place deterministically in a
priory, rather put on canvas pre-requicities that are not always under the economically
technical prism of market's structure; that however could implicitly confirm the need
for appropriate pricing.
Nevertheless, the main question is the effectiveness of such mechanism in terms of
distributional justice. And besides the long debate, it has been highlighted the need for
further research since most  literature  stress on traditional  “war”  between different
economical  schools  of  thought  and  not  that  much  in  optimum  trade-off  between
“marketisation” and distributional justice, as per se.
Finally, the existence of some relation between the way we price water and datasets in
the inter-linkages between water and energy or agriculture was pointed out.
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Game Theory In Service Of Nexus
In this chapter, will be discussed why game theory could be used in water-energy nexus
and compare game theory with other tools. The reason for such choice is to encourage
modelers for using game theory in their models, so that to reach stable and feasible
solutions which will feed back policy making procedure with enhanced liability.
In  one  hand,  and  especially  after  Aarhus  Convention,  policy  process  and  decision-
making  is  broadly  considering  stakeholders'  involvement  (Stec  et  al.,  2000;  UNECE,
2013a; UNECE, 2014; UNECE, 2015a; NEA, 2015); so that today is being in general seen
as  a  meaningful  part  of  formulating and implementing good policy  (Gold and Bass
2010; Davis, 2014; Flammini et al., 2014; Hurford et al., 2014; NEA, 2015). Therefore,
various approaches (concerning several  issues) have been suggested, developed and
assessed (Schmeer,  1999, Jones and Fleming,  2003; NEA, 2004, World Bank, 2010).
Albeit  practice  showed  that  is  not  always  easy  to  fulfill  the  context  of  engaging
stakeholders, like in participatory methods (Kallis et al., 2007).
On the other hand, quite several papers towards optimality (Antipova, 2002; Hurford et
al., 2014; Hurford et al., 2014a; Saavedra Antolinez, 2014) and trade-offs (Giampietro,
2013; Hurford et al., 2014; Hurford et al., 2014a) have been published.
Nevertheless,  despite  that  modeling  and  visualization  of  patterns,  trade-offs  and
optimal  solutions  let  governance  conflicts  to  become  more  understandable  for
stakeholders while providing useful insights to policy makers (Couclelis, 2000; Hurford
et al., 2014), nonetheless modeling may also entail a potential weakness due to the
excessive reliance on reductionism (Box, 1979; Giampietro, 2010).
Moreover, not only a model is as useful as the purpose for which it was constructed
(Couclelis, 2000) but also is constraint by several factors as the referenced geographic
place, climate conditions, and different production technologies (Chawla, 2015).
Besides,  optimal  solutions  (from  central  planer's  view)  are  not  necessarily
stable/feasible due to conflicting interests and objectives of multiple actors. The latter
occurs  because  cooperation (group  rationality)  is  not  necessarily  a  stronger  driving
force than individual benefits (individual rationality) (Madani, 2009; Read et. al, 2014;
Madani et al.. 2015a).
Moreover, politicians simply are not willing just to thoroughly do what is suggested by
a model (Couclelis, 2000). A decision maker must ensure that the undertaking is not
only physically, environmentally, financially and economically feasible, but also socially
and  politically  feasible  (Madani,  2009;  Kolios  and  Read,  2013).  Therefor  their
appropriate  weight  in  decisions  making  should  be  given,  albeit  their  impact  is
evaluated subjectively and at best cannot easily be quantified. (Gold and Bass, 2010). 
But even modeling approaches that are not orientated around optimal solutions but
rather  identifying trade-offs at  best,  still  are subjected to uncertainty  and fuzziness
while  could  generate  large  output  of  information;  thus  complicating  interpretation
(Giampietro, 2013). Like the trade-offs associated with multiple potential outcomes for
case of Preliminary Revised Draft SGEIS in July 2011, after New York's placing drilling
(shale gas) on hold at 2009 (Scott et al., 2009).
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Not to mention that not all nexus problems are a win-win situation; like in cases where
policy-makers are in the middle of an increasing resource scarcity event and have to
make value judgments on many occurred trade-offs (Davis, 2014).
Having above in mind, can easily be concluded that trade-offs and optimal solutions are
useful and informative, but are not enough by themselves for an effective governance
of nexus. In addition to these, there must be the consensus and acceptance in practice
of actors and stakeholders. Else optimal solutions might not be stable. And if such so,
then some regulatory framework that will  be based on them, might fail to promote
competitiveness, investment and innovation, and by that to affect effective transition
to a resilient water and energy secure system (Gold and Bass, 2010 ; Kolios and Read,
2013; Read et al., 2014).
The available multiple decision making tools lack in terms of replicating the capacity for
compromise amongst stakeholders, where game theory can offer alternative approach
by  offering  near-optimal  solutions  that  could  be  proved  as  stable  (Madani  et  al.,
2015a).
Game theory, since first introduced (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) involved
enough so that today covers a wide range and diversified areas of knowledge like from
biology (Sigmund, 2005) to political and socials sciences (Ostrom, 1990; Kollock, 1994),
and  in  general  to  all  behavioral  sciences  (Gintis,2009).  However,  the  output  of
theoretical  such models  is  highly  dependent  on  assumptions;  like  rationality  which
could be questionable in cases like those of asymmetric information (Simon, 1995).
Such assumptions could lead from stable but not attainable solution (e.g. can mutually
satisfy all  players) in best-worst scenario to equilibrium points that may not exist in
worst-worst  scenario  (Arthur,  1994;  Epstein  and  Hammond,  2002;  Fellman,  2011).
Nonetheless,  game  theory  can  predict  whether  optimal  resolutions  are  reachable,
while could explain how decision-makers’ rational behavior – trying to maximize their
own objectives – might result in overall Pareto-inferior outcomes, despite the fact that
stakeholders’  decisions  and  behaviors  might  seem  to  be  irrational  from  system's
engineering perspective. However,  modelers should be aware of variation in game's
conditions during its evolution and the altering effect to its structure, equilibria and
results (Madani, 2009).
Yet, game theory could contribute to questions, such as (Madani et al., 2015a):
1. How will an individual organization's strategy fare in relation to the strategies of
other stakeholders?
2. How can multiple long-term aims of different organizations be reconciled?
3. What are the most robust strategies across stakeholders (e.g. for a particular
region)?
4. What  outcomes  might  result  from  different  configurations  for  each  of  the
stakeholders?
Game theory could be used complementary to computational models (Krause et al.,
2006; Madani et al., 2011; Pinto et al., 2013), e.g. Agent-Based Models (ABM), Multi-
Criteria Decision Making (MCDM).
Most  of  the literature  in  the wider  considered WEF nexus  concern the water-food
interrelation focusing on irrigation and water allocation/conflict for farming (Yaron and
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Ratner,  1990; Weissing and Ostrom,  1990; Dinar et  al.,  1992;  Ostrom and Gardner,
1993; Xepapadeas, 1996; Zorba et al., 2001; Faysse, 2003; Madani, 2009; Kerachian et
al., 2010; Finger and Borer, 2013; Kimmich, 2013; Msangi, 2014;); with a trend from
cooperative – mainly during 90s – to non-cooperative games (Parrachino et al., 2006;
Podimata and Yannopoulos, 2015). As far as energy is being concerned in the broader
sense of WEF nexus, mostly game theory applies in conjunction or as a part to climate
change aspects, e.g. carbon footprint, GHGs mitigation options. Or correctly could be
said that, the notion of energy is tacitly implied in game theory through climate change
dialogue; like from the perspective of common pool resource (CPR) problem (Kutasi,
2010),  public  goods game (Hasson,  2009),  or  based on integrated climate-economy
models (Yang, 2008) and energy-economy model (Bosetti, 2012).
So the cornerstone to build upon has already been put – while there is whole field to
play ball when it comes to joint assessment of energy and water using game theory
methods – nevertheless more research has to be done towards this direction.
Also, to be pointed – on the pro et contra of water and energy components – that
whichever noticed inadequacy of water in clearly signaled prices (as examined above),
is  being  counterweighted  by  taking  in  consideration  the  game  theory  literature  of
actors'  and stakeholders'  involvement  in attainable and stable solutions.  Thus,  joint
consideration of nexus components does not only impose challenges but also provide
opportunities for better integration.
Summary
Summarizing, could be said that stakeholders' involvement in policy-making is not an
easy task. Participatory methods, modeling optimal solutions and trade-offs, bear its
own weaknesses.
Concentrating on optimal solution and trade-offs, practice and literature provides an
undeniable support in favor of trade-offs. This is not only due to their own nature, but
also for reasons of actors mentality and political feasibility. Nevertheless, still modeling
approaches oriented around trade-offs are in one hand subjected to uncertainties and
fuzziness while on the other hand could generate a large amount of information that is
not easily manageable and could complicate interpretation.
After all – besides that every situation is not a win-win one – the available multiple
decision making tools do lack in terms of replicating the capacity for compromising
amongst stakeholders; in relation to game theory.
And  despite  that  game  theory  may  involve  not  attainable  solutions  or  equilibrium
points that  may not exist  for some scenario,  still  can predict whether solutions are
reachable  and  could  explain  how  decision-makers’  rational  behavior  could  lead  to
overall  Pareto-inferior  outcome; as long as modelers  are aware of  game conditions
variation during the game and their reciprocal implications.
In WEF's context, game theory mostly been used on water-food interrelation, trending
from cooperative to non-cooperative games. So further work has to be done on joint
assessment of  energy and water  using game theory;  especially  for  non-cooperative
games.
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Finally, highlighted that joint consideration of nexus components does not only impose
challenges but also provide opportunities for better integration when considering the
pro  and  contras  of  energy  and  water  components  of  nexus  in  relation  to  clearly
signaled prices and game theory literature.
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In Transboundary Basin Level
Across dimensions, due to inter-sectoral nature of water share and collaboration, the
management  of  “coupled”  resources  in  transboundary  water  basin  level  is  facing
difficulties  but  also  opportunities  for  cooperation.  And  though,  as  was  pointed  in
previous  chapter,  game  theory  does  provide  sound  scientific  method  for  whether
optimal  solutions  are  reachable,  however  cannot  stand-alone  provide  the  needed
framework for forging cooperation. Thus, the contribution of IWRM and international
legal regime will be inquired. 
More analytic, will be discussed the determinant of cooperation; as a precondition for
effective  governance  and  avoidance  of  conflict  escalation.  The  reason  is  not  only
because synergies should be perceived also across spatial boundaries, but also due to
the fact that not always supra-national organizations exist in transboundary basins. Or
simply, because international watercourses are a considerable part of earth's land and
serve the livelihood of many people; notwithstanding that few water disputes have
actually found their way to the International Court of Justice - ICJ (Grzybowski, 2010).
Thence, it goes without saying, that is pointless to quantify on number of cases within
the  context  of  nexus  –  since  is  not  even  well  established yet  (like  IWRM) in  such
transboundary basin scale – that have been reviewed by ECJ; though one of common
concepts  of  friction between upstream-downstream  littoral  states  is  that  of  hydro-
electric projects. Furthermore, various examples will be provided and the effectiveness
of nexus versus IWRM and international legal regime's toolkit (wherever this serves the
scope of parent paper) will be compared.
Before starting, to state that the purpose of this chapter is not to conduct a full analysis
but  to  provide  those  key  elements  that  are  crucial  for  promoting  concept  of
cooperation through nexus paradigm; using auxiliary knowledge on the topic coming
from resource management (IWRM) and international legal regime practicing.
Beginning, as already stated water and energy are inextricably interlinked, while both
being dependent on the ecosystems, but this does not necessarily imply that water-
energy nexus should be resolved in the framework of a single intervention (ADC, 2015).
This fragmented governance is reflected on the fact that water and energy are being
subjected to different international legal regimes (Boute, 2016). 
Nonetheless,  even  fragmented  governance  still  requires  coherent,  responsible  and
consultative  planning  else  spillover  effects  across  sectoral  policies  could be  proved
more  risky  and  therefor  more  expensive  (Phillips  et  al.,  2006;  Mekong  River
Commission, 2012; Howells and Rogner, 2014; De Strasser, 2016). On the other hand,
when it comes to “resource coupling” and due to the fact that few normative principles
are provided (by nexus conceptualization itself) on how governance should occur, some
scholars argue on how nexus can effectively contribute to “multi-tiered” institutional
arrangements – especially when is governed by different institutional levels (Benson et
al., 2015; UNECE, 2015a). Field where IWRM proved useful, by promoting transparency,
collaborative decision-making principles, and use of specific policy instruments (ibid;
Benson  et  al.,  2012;  Cap-Net,  2014;  UNECE,  2015a).  However,  IWRM's  traditional
analytical scope considered by other scholars as limited, and without always taking into
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consideration re-enforcing stresses or indirect links;  like how climate change affects
energy production through water demand (Phillips et al., 2006; Welsh et al., 2014; De
Strasser, 2016).
Moreover,  frictions  between  transboundary  (water  sharing)  countries  due  to  inter-
sectoral nature of water share and allocation, is not rare phenomenon. For example,
Egypt that is a country at downstream of Nile is opposed to Ethiopia's and Sudan's
aspiration for building dams to produce electric power at the upper part of the stream
(Andrews-Speed, 2012). Or like the case of Rogun Dam, for which over three decades
only preliminary construction has been carried out due to occurred tensions between
energy-starved  Tajikistan  and cotton-producing Uzbekistan  (Škoba,  2013).  Of  course
transboundary management does not imply only tensions but also opportunities for
cooperation, as in the case of Mekong River Commission (MRC), in which four – known
as  the  Lower  Mekong  River  (LMR)  basin  countries  –  of  six  riparian  countries  are
participating (Belinskij, 2015). Only the LMR serve the needs of more than 60 million
people. But, the aforementioned cases are not the only ones; around the world were
counted over 260 (Škoba, 2013).
So,  easily  can  be  understood  that  concerning  transboundary  basins,  a  stepwise
progressive approach that provides parts with enough time to build trust and deepen
the inter-sectoral approach between them, is an adequate condition. International law
could  be  helpful  towards  this  direction  (Belinskij,  2015;  UNECE,  2015a),  while  the
purpose  of  other  step-wise  approaches  –  namely  of  nexus  and  IWRM  –  is  mainly
fulfilled  in  terms  of  a  comprehensive  economic  analysis  that  could  be  handful  for
policy-makers (WEF, 2011; Benson et al., 2015). At this point, regarding international
water law to be acknowledged that lacks in concrete specification for its procedural
elements when it comes to transboundary nexus and mainly offers the institutional
approach (Belinskij, 2015; Keskinen and Varis, 2016).
Such approach in service of nexus introduced during the 6th session of the Meeting of
the Parties (MOPs) of United Nations' Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Water
Convention  (WC).  It  was  the  result  different  international  legal  regimes  based
difficulties and the need for a more integrated approach.
The  determinant  of  cooperation  is  vital  in  effective  governance  and  avoidance  of
conflict  escalation (UNECE,  2013).  In  this  spirit,  seven key principles fur  succeeding
higher  level  of  maturity  concerning  cooperation  between  riparian  states  through
effectively operating joint bodies, are being mentioned (UNECE, 2015, UNECE, 2015a):
• The broad competence of a joint body, which on the basis of IWRM, addresses
in  a  complex  way  the  entire  spectrum  of  issues  related  to  the  sustainable
development,  management,  use  (including  infrastructure)  and  protection  of
transboundary waters;
• A sufficiently broad and complete representation of national authorities in the
joint body, involving participation beyond the water management authorities to
include  representatives  from  the  ministries  of  the  environment,  fishery,
agriculture, transport, health, energy, hydrometeorology authorities, economy
and finance, as appropriate;
-18-
• A certain flexibility of the agreement establishing the joint body that enables
cooperation  to  develop  progressively  in  terms  of  scope,  mandate  and  the
riparian countries involved;
• A regular exchange of information and consultation mechanisms;
• A  process  that  facilitates  the  assessment  of  impacts  (transboundary  and
intersectoral)  from  developments,  and  the  negotiation  of  an  agreement  on
them among riparian countries;
• A framework for monitoring long-term impacts (e.g. infrastructure);
• Mechanisms for public participation and stakeholder involvement.
Nevertheless, not always riparian states are part of Water Conventions, par example
none  of  the  Mekong  countries  is  a  party  to  the  ECE  Water  Convention  and  only
Vietnam  is  a  party  to  the  UN Watercourses  Convention.  Nonetheless,  the  general
principles of the UN and ECE conventions can be regarded as a source of international
customary water  law also in the Mekong River context;  for example in Article 4 of
1995's Mekong Agreement the determinant of cooperation is similarly described as in
UN Water Convention following principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity
(Belinskij,  2015).  Of  course,  even though 1995 Mekong Agreement  is  characterized
from serious  deficiencies in  terms of  nexus  still  provides  tools  for  developing their
cooperation within nexus notion (ibid).
Going  further,  the  enforcement  tools  of  Mekong  River  Commission  are  notably
consultation,  negotiation,  diplomacy  and  persuasion  (ibid).  Such  choices,  are
considered to be rather expected where will for understanding community interests is
being exhibited (UNECE, 2015a); like in Sava sub-basin of Danube river basin in South-
Eastern  Europe,  where  International  Sava  River  Basin  Commission  (ISRBC)  already
promotes exploration of energy and agriculture components of nexus (ibid). Otherwise,
if  lack  of  trust  and  understanding  prevails,  the  likelihood  of  establishing  effective
cooperation is not the strongest case (Belinskij, 2015; UNECE, 2015a); like in Syr Darya
sub-basin of the Aral  Sea Basin in Central  Asia where nexus assessment focuses on
national policies and some foreign officers may discuss mainly bilaterally water issues
ad hoc (UNECE, 2015a).
Summary
Summarizing, it's a fact that nexus concept lacks where IWRM proved useful, namely in
providing tools  for casting “multi-tiered” institutional  arrangements;  but the limited
scope of the latter, operates as an impediment in relation with re-enforcing stresses
and indirect links.
Furthermore,  nexus  and IWRM encourage  stepwise  approaches  –  like  international
water  law  offers,  but  with  the  difference  –  that  are  focusing  in  comprehensive
economic analysis.
On the pros of international water law is that promotes cooperation, even though it
lacks  on  procedural  elements.  Cooperation  is  a  key  element  of  a  successful  and
effective  governance,  nevertheless  not  all  riparian  states  are  part  of  Water
Conventions. Notwithstanding the latter, practice shows that general principles of the
UN and ECE conventions can be regarded as a source of international customary water
law (e.g. 1995 Mekong Agreement).
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Additionally, provided examples highlighted the importance of trust, understanding of
community interest and cooperation. So effectively promoting them is a challenge for
nexus concept, that could also face difficulties when international leading organizations
in nexus do tend to approach basin states with-in a top-down scheme in the absence of
a supra-national organization between those states. Therefore, nexus concept should
not only enclose within its context such provisions but also offer the respective tool
set. Tools that should also take in consideration other facts, as fragmented governance
of international nexus requires coherent, responsible and consultative planning.
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Part 2: Technology And Green 
Infrastructures
Technologies  and  infrastructures  are  the  core  of  nexus  conceptualization  in  this
chapter,  since both do provide insides of  resource use efficiency.  Also,  can provide
valuable information for policy and decision makers, investors, undertakers and states.
In this part of the dissertation there is a shift from a more water centric view of nexus
(that was apparent at first part), to a more:
• balanced water-energy view when considering technology role, and
• nature-centric  view  when  considering  natural  (or  green)  infrastructures
integration to nexus.
The reason for latter is that nature adds an extra dimension to nexus concept due to
the beneficial  potential  coming from the securitization of  nexus  components,  while
operating  as  a  mediate  to  the  wider-perceived  concept  of  nexus  including  other
components as food, land, climate (Krchnak et al., 2011).
Furthermore, the chapter that discuss technological issues, does not aim in becoming
an engineering manual but to operate  as the intermediate link between nexus and
green infrastructures while providing useful insights for decision and policy makers.
“Technologies  and  Nexus”  chapter,  will  mostly  be  developed  around  unanticipated
consequences,  while  “Natural  Infrastructure  On  Nexus”  chapter  will  be  mostly
concentrated in partially coupling of green infrastructure investments and nexus risks
and dependencies.
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Technologies and Nexus
In this  chapter  will  be discussed the role of  technology,  in connection to research,
investments,  policies and future scenarios. Nevertheless, analyzing and assessing all
technological solutions, is out of this paper scope. In this vein, will be used examples
and data for certain technologies as a “vehicle” for identifying and highlighting key
elements  of  the  aforementioned  aspects  of  nexus.  Furthermore,  the  role  of  this
chapter  itself  is  to  operate  as  a  medium  between  nexus  and  next  chapter  (green
infrastructure);  due to the fact that  new technologies ramps up the need for more
advanced  cooling  systems.  To  be  noted  that  a  big  part  of  this  chapter  is  on
unanticipated consequences of technology in: what causes them, challenges that must
be addressed and suggestions.
“Silo” Consideration And Unanticipated Consequences
It's  common  knowledge  that  policies  are  being  shaped  by  technology  ,  while
policies/regulations  could  induce  innovation  in  technologies.  For  example,
environmental regulations could induce innovations in green technologies and by that
to help economies break away from a polluting economic trajectory and move to a
“clean”  one  (Huenteler,  2011;  Dechezleprêtre,  2014).  But  advancing  in  some  way
towards  sustainability  for  one  component  of  nexus,  could  impact  on  another.  In
particular,  according  to  2012's  World  Energy  Outlook  “New Policies”  scenario,  as  a
direct result of shifting towards higher-efficiency in power plants – with more advanced
cooling systems and the increased production of biofuel – is likely expected an increase
by 85% of water consumption for energy within the next two decades (IEA, 2012). Fact
which  is  connected  to  higher  water  withdrawals  (ibid).  So,  new  technologies  or
technological advancements can give rise to unanticipated consequences (Healy, 2005).
This could be partly attributed to complexity of a system or concept (Dörner, 1996;
Healy, 2005); like nexus inter-linkages.
Another unanticipated consequence could be derived from the adoption of advanced
cooling system by fossil fuel-based and nuclear power plants so that to reduce water
requirements. However, in general such solutions do lack in competitiveness to existing
competing technologies in terms of cost; in particular entails higher capital costs and
reduces  plant's  efficiency (OECD,  2006; Weiss and Bonvillian,  2009;  IEA,  2012).  But
nuclear  and  fossil  fuel-based  plants  are  not  the  only  energy  producers.  When
concerning undertakers that produce power from renewables – under the particular
market conditions and policy frameworks – they bear a certain competitive status. For
example, as estimated for 2010 and the state of Germany, the onshore wind energy
was likely to be competitive with the fossil electricity by 2015, solar PV by 2020, and
offshore wind by 2030 (Huenteler, 2011; Kost and Schlegl, 2010). But would it be the
same if,  a  new  introduced  regulation  enforce  conventional  electricity  producers  to
lower their water footprint by means of advanced cooling system? Obviously this will
lessen  their  competitive  position  by  raising  their  capital  cost  and  harming  their
efficiency. 
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Going  further  in  unanticipated  consequences,  when technological  advancements  in
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing allowed the development of shale gas, water
and energy resource coupling interfere with national security (Freeland, 2011; Medlock
et al.,  2011).  Also,  associated to multi-tiered decision-making and competing goals,
little scientific agreement,  limited time and resources,  and inequalities in access to
power and information that demand combined consideration at different spatial and
temporal scales (Lachapelle et al., 2003; Scott et al., 2009).
After all above, could be said that separated consideration of technological solutions in
a  “silo”  approach  of  nexus  components,  not  only  could  affect  (towards  opposing
directions) components' security due to complexity of nexus, but also when combined
with regulatory interventions could drive changes in competitiveness status of market.
Thus, there is an obvious need for a more efficient and cost-effective technological
solutions, that depend less to water. At the mean time, policy-makers should consider
promoting  stronger  the  utilization  of  combined  technological  solutions  or  of
technological-infrastructure solution, having in mind the complex nature of nexus. At
this  point  to  be  acknowledged  that,  transition  to  less  water  intensive  energy
technologies is additionally limited by existing institutional  arrangements  created to
support current electricity generating technology (Scott et al.,  2009); therefore such
arrangements should also be taken in consideration.
Preliminary Evidences From CSP Investments
Newer developed technologies for lower water consumption are still not that sufficient
and cost more (OECD, 2006; IEA, 2012). Like dry cooling systems for CSP plants. Dry
cooling  systems  demand  higher  capital  costs,  higher  auxiliary  operating  power
requirements and an overall  lower plant performance, especially on hot days, when
the peak power is needed most (U.S. Department Of Energy, 2009). Even hybrid wet-
dry systems (that allow the plant to maintain design or near- design performance) do
bear higher cost for the cooling system; compared to water cooling (ibid).
But, do such technological  solutions for power plants that have such extremely low
share of global electricity output – even if find no application in elsewhere – deserve
such attention? Experienced showed that participation in produced power mix at some
point of time does not necessarily pose constraints for future development. For the
example of CSP, the participation was almost to be neglected for 2012 (IEA, 2012) and
according to “New Policies” scenario of World Energy Outlook 2012 could reach 1% at
2035 (ibid), or according to “Advanced Scenario” of CSP Global Outlook 2009 the global
CSP capacity is projected to be at 1500 GW by 2050 (Richter et al., 2009); when in 2010
was  estimated approximately  1299 MW and already  by  2012 increased to  1,9  GW
worldwide (IRENA, 2012).
Furthermore, a power production technology with rising trend of its installed capacity,
that is usually found in semi-arid areas, would ideally have to select between water and
dry cooling system. But selection is not always an option, like when CSP is deployed in
semi-arid  areas  with water  scarcity  or  in  arid  areas;  e.g.  the case of  “Solar  Energy
Generating Systems” in the Mohave Desert (IEA, 2012, IRENA, 2012). Or how much of
an option, could it be for places prone to aridification due to climate change when
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considering  projects  lifetime;  e.g.  in  case  of  Nile  Basin  for  which  scientific  reports
recognizes a tendency for becoming more arid in the next 30-40 years (SFG, 2013).
So, investments under the prism of nexus should be assessed by policy-makers for all
technological  solutions  –  even if  not  such  popular  today  –  taking  in  account  local
peculiarities (e.g. water constraints),  but also climate and impact of climate change.
Additionally,  the  need  for  reliable  toolkit  and  data  in  assessing  risk  relating  to
uncertainty  from climate change impact on nexus,  is  also imposed by the need for
selecting  the  most  suitable  technological  solution.  Or  reversely,  technological
advancements should be ready to address problem of climate change impact based on
reliable toolkits and climate data. 
However, thermodynamics of energy infrastructures'  operation (i.e. LNG) should not
always  be perceived as  a  problem. Under conditions could be exploited so that  to
produce (desalinated) water suitable for irrigation and other activities (Antonelli, 1983;
Cao, 2015). Thus, not only technological advancements are in need, but also creative
combinations  of  existing  energy  and  water  technologies  in  order  to  create  smart
solutions  that  efficiently  will  exploit  system's  potentiality;  based  on  existed
technologies.
Summary
Summarizing, unanticipated consequences could occur by use of technology or from
technological  advancements  that  are  connected  to  nexus  complexity.  Additionally,
there is an obvious need for more efficient and cost-effective technological solutions –
that depend less to water – and creative combinations of existing energy and water
technologies for maximizing benefits from their utilization. To be noted that transition
to less water intensive energy technologies is constrained by existing infrastructures
and by  institutional  arrangements  created  to  support  current  electricity  generating
technology. Furthermore, investments under the prism of nexus should be assessed by
policy makers for all technological solutions – even if not such popular today – taking in
account  local  peculiarities  (e.g.  water  constraints),  but  also  climate  and  impact  of
climate  change.  In  connection  to  latter,  both  more  accurate  climate  data  and
assessment tools for climate change impact are in need. Finally, policy makers should
be aware of technological advancements impact on national security, relation between
water quality and individual economic gain.
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Natural Infrastructures On Nexus
In  this  chapter  will  be  discussed  whether  there  is  a  coincidence  of  interests  of
concerned parts involved on green infrastructures, what kind of benefits does this kind
of infrastructures do provide and inspect some key elements of investing on them. The
purpose for such approach is to highlight how a cost-competitive and effective solution
– that is not a totally new concept – could be impeded. Also to be noted, that this
chapter is not a statistical survey of investments around the world, rather try to use
statistical  data  only  where  this  serve  the  scope  of  dissertation.  Additionally,  even
though  that  taxation  and  incentives  are  an  important  part  of  investing  causation,
focusing on such not only could be at least one separate paper by itself, but also the big
picture would be lost; therefore, they are implicit mentioned through “silo thinking”.
Opportunities And Impediments
Despite  that  nature  is  part  of  infrastructure  portfolio  of  every  country  and  every
economy  based  on  its  capacity  to  complement,  augment  or  replace  the  services
provided by traditional engineered infrastructure (Krchnak et al., 2011), for many years
now  governments  and  private  sector  were  heavily  relied  on  gray  infrastructures
(Ozment  et al.,  2015).  Gray  infrastructure  is  a general  term referring to man-made
engineered assets using non living, non-self-maintaining systems – typically of concrete
and steel construction – designed to provide a required function; such as damns and
water treatment plants (WBCSD, 2015).
Nevertheless,  mitigation  of  gray  infrastructures  by  integrating  or  engineering
standalone  green ones,  can contribute  to  followings  (Ozment  et  al.,  2015;  WBCSD,
2015; Bennett et al., 2016).
• Provide benefits to society, climate and the natural environment: 
◦ protect and restore ecosystem services;
◦ water, food, energy security;
1994 threat  security  case  because of  Diama dam (Senegal)  was  ignoring
natural infrastructure value (Krchnak et al., 2011)
◦ enhance resilience to climate change; and
◦ provide a suite of additional social and economic benefits.
• Help business to address its own needs:
◦ reduce costs,
◦ reduce company risk and increase company's resilience,
e.g Sarapiqui watershed case for Energia Global (now Enel Latin America) in
1990s (Hanson et al, 2012);
◦ capitalize on business drivers and novel opportunities
of those that (directly or indirectly) depend on environmental resources;
e.g. Canaan Valley case for Allegheny Power (Hanson et al, 2012);
◦ meet government, regulatory, or permitting requirements,
◦ address stakeholder and community concerns,
i.e. resource availability, HSE, biodiversity conservation.
e.g. restoration project of Old Rhine River by Electricité de France (WBCSD,
2015)
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Thence,  it's  easily  understandable  that  there  are  overlapped  interests  on  green
infrastructures for business, investors, states and people to be met.  Thus, natural or
semi-natural designed systems could provide the ground for sustainable development,
in a context of understanding common needs in private and public sector.
Unhelpfully, policy frameworks for economic development and poverty reduction tend
to marginalize ecosystems as simply a conservation issue (Krchnak et al., 2011). Such
silo thinking, at  first  could contribute in making problem more comprehensible and
thus easier to be analyzed, but in  long run could create fragmented responsibilities,
leading up to legal inconsistencies, false incentives and disregard externalities (Özçevik,
2015).
Additionally,  companies  often  fail  to  make  the  connection  between  the  health  of
ecosystems and the business bottom line, or are not fully aware of the extent of their
reliance and impact on ecosystems and the possible ramifications (Hanson et al., 2008).
Luckily,  after  isolated  success  stories,  investment  in  green  infrastructure  seems  to
rapidly increase. For example, between 2011 and 2013, the number of water utilities
engagement in watershed investment programs reporting outcomes tripled, albeit is
considered small  relative  to  the  sector’s  risk  exposure;  not  to  mention  that  is  not
known the real increase since part of it, is attributed to the fact that while going back
to past less of realized investments were being reported (Bennett and Carroll, 2014).
Also  in  2013,  food  security  and  water-related  energy  risks,  have  attracted  little
investment (ibid). The latter imbalance observed at investment patterns, signifies only
a  partially  coupling  of  green  infrastructure  investments  and  nexus  risks  and
dependencies.
Moreover, on one hand is becoming more difficult and less appealing than it used to be
in the past to build and maintain large scale gray infrastructures and on the other hand
there is a noticeable uncertainty how land use change, climate change, and population
growth will  impact nexus security and thus in planning investments  (Ozment et al.,
2015). So not only new decision making processes and management strategies should
be introduced (Stakhiv, 2011) but also there should be a diffusion of them; so that will
become popular choice for decision-makers and executives boards.
At the top of it, another issue around investing arises from the point of top-down or
bottom up scheme between nexus and investing in green infrastructures. In particular
as mentioned at previous section, nexus concept tends to foster a top-down approach.
While working on green infrastructures' benefits – e.g. social equity in development –
is mainly succeeded by incorporating more bottom-up strategies and actions (Krchnak
et al., 2011). This might partially explain the observed under-investment and not fully
coupling in 2013 (Bennett and Carroll, 2014), since crucial role in green investing plays
not  only  to  prioritize  investment  activities  but  also  the  need  to  incorporate
mechanisms for decentralizing decision making in multi-stakeholder processes (Smith
and Cartin, 2011); where top-down scheme lacks.
A Loophole To Nexus?
Finally, misconception on the role of green infrastructures could be created due to the
criticism that carbon sinks (LULUCF - Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry) – which
are associated to afforestation, reforastation and forest management into the Kyoto
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Protocol  (UNFCC,  2000)  –  faced  (Richards  and  Andersson,  2001;  Rousseaux,  2005;
Shishlov and Bellassen, 2012).
Nexus uses natural infrastructure as analogues. For example, power plants in order to
avoid causing thermal pollution to aquatic ecosystems can either invest in expensive
highly costly gray infrastructure (e.g.  cooling tower,  refrigeration units) or use using
cooling  shade  from  natural  infrastructure.  The  latter  in  case  of  city  of  Medford
(Oregon)  helped  in  meeting  its  legal  thermal  requirements  for  wastewater  at
approximately half cost of what would have to cover in case of using mechanical means
(Ozment et al., 2015).
There are cases that deforestation was threatening hydropower scheme. Like in case of
Costa Rican hydro-power company Energia Global (now Enel Latin America) when in
the 1990s was literally losing its source of power due to the deforestation that took
place  at  slopes  upstream  of  the  company’s  dams  by  landowners  to  use  land  for
livestock and agriculture. With deforestation leading to increment in soil erosion and
thus  in  lowering  reservoir  capacity  by  increment  of  sedimentation  rate  in  the
reservoirs, the threat for deteriorating the hydro-power turbines was looming. For that,
Enel  now  contributes  to  renumeration  scheme  through  “National  Fund  for  Forest
Financing”  to those landowners  for  conserving remaining forests  or  that  agreed to
reforest their land at upstream. In this case, green infrastructure contribute a lot in
fragile balance of nexus inter-linkages, by rewarding farmers for sustainable agricultural
practices,  improving  watershed  health,  and  promoting  energy  security  by  reducing
wear and tear on hydro-power facilities (Hanson et al, 2012; Ozment et al., 2015).
So green infrastructures  not only should not bear the criticism of carbon sinks but
should considered as a ready solution to offer its services wherever is in need without
being a loophole for the nexus concept.
Summary
Summarizing, natural or semi-natural designed systems could provide the ground for
sustainable development – due to overlapped interests for business, investors, states
and people – in a context of understanding common needs in private and public sector.
Nevertheless, there is a noticeable imbalance at investment patterns, that signifies only
a  partially  coupling  of  green  infrastructure  investments  and  nexus  risks  and
dependencies. It could be because companies fail to make the connection between the
health of ecosystems and the beneficial effect to business. Or, because business ignore
the full extend of their exposure and dependence on ecosystems. Another factor, could
be  the  silo  approach  in  policy-making  that  in  long  run  could  create  fragmented
responsibilities,  lead  up  to  legal  inconsistencies,  false  incentives  and  disregard
externalities. Therefore, new decision making processes and management strategies
should be introduced, especially today that building and maintaining large scale gray
infrastructures considered less appealing choice.
The need for new decision making processes and management strategies is enhanced
by introduced uncertainty  due to land use change,  climate change,  and population
growth.  Also,  due to  constraint  in green infrastructures'  investments  that  might  be
inherited from the contradiction between a bottom-up approach of aforementioned
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versus a top-down managed nexus;  thus nexus should incorporate more bottom-up
strategies and actions. Finally, to be noticed that green infrastructures not only should
not bear the criticism of carbon sinks but are considered as a ready solution to offer its
services wherever is in need without being a loophole for the nexus concept.
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Conclusions
Various topics within nexus context have been elaborated through this paper, which
are considered to be crucial for a more effective governance of nexus while providing
useful  insights  for  research,  computational  models,  business  opportunities  and
investments.
These  topics,  developed  so  that  to  benefit  decision  and  policy  makers  to  better
understand  the  concept  of  nexus  across  horizontal/vertical  scales  and  dimension,
researchers to embrace validity of their research, help modelers to provide solutions
that will be more stable and feasible, help business managers to make the connection
between ecosystem's  services,  natural  resources  coupling  and the business  bottom
line.
While various conclusions, have been separately provided at the end of each chapter,
here will be highlighted the key ones.
First  of  all,  having  in  mind  all  above,  can  be  said  that  though  nexus  concept  is
constantly  being  evolved,  nevertheless  does  not  impose  only  challenges  but  also
opportunities for coupled resource management.
Concerning  data  (like  in  metrics  and  notions)  both  researchers  and  policy-makers
should be aware of  the perplexities that  could be inherited from a not like-for-like
comparison; and should always provide/require accurate metadata.  The not like-for-
like comparison could be partly attributed to the effect of water pricing politics that
weakly  delineate  the real  value of  water  or  because environmental  externalities of
using natural resources and services aren't clearly signaled.
Nevertheless, deployment of MBMs concerning water – within nexus context and for
setting appropriate pricing, under the paradigm of security – is being challenged by
accusations for incomplete integration of distributional justice.
One way or another,  actors  and stakeholders should be engaged in nexus decision-
making  and  planning.  Even  though,  it  is  not  always  easy  to  induce  participatory
methods. Addressing this need, game theory comes to provide its services. And even if
may involve not attainable solutions or equilibrium points that might not exist for some
scenario,  still  can  predict  whether  solutions  are  reachable  and  could  explain  how
decision-makers’  rational  behavior  could lead to overall  Pareto-inferior  outcome;  as
long as modelers are aware of game conditions variation during the game and their
reciprocal  implications.  Nevertheless,  further  research  for  non-cooperative  games
within joint assessment of water-energy components is in need.
Engaging stakeholders is as essential as building cross sectoral and cross dimensional
synergies. In transboundary basin level, step-wise approaches are in need to build trust
and deepen the inter-sectoral approach; especially if water-energy nexus governance is
fragmented and is not resolved through a single framework. Nexus, in order to stronger
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promote cooperation should be able to provide such capable tools;  especially since
international water law lacks on procedural elements on promoting cooperation.
In  case  of  transboundary  basin  level,  building  trust  and synergies  –  that  will  forge
cooperation – is  a fragile  concept when considering that  not always  supra-national
organizations do exist.  The latter  gets more problematic when international  leading
organizations in nexus do tend to approach basin states with-in a top-down scheme.
The issue of selecting top-down or/and bottom-up schemes is not limed to synergies in
international level but also can force constraints on investing in green infrastructures.
Thus,  in  general,  more bottom-up strategies  and actions should be incorporated  in
nexus. Of course, more impediments can be identified when concerning imbalance at
investment patterns;  which signifies only a partially coupling of green infrastructure
investments and nexus risks and dependencies.
Like the fact that companies might fail to make the connection between the health of
ecosystems  and  the  beneficial  effect  to  business,  which  signifies  the  need  for
introducing new decision making processes and management strategies.
Management strategies that  will  also be able to assess investment opportunities in
green infrastructures. Green infrastructures, which proved that are not a loophole for
nexus and provided adequately their services in many cases. Like when compared with
cases of attaining unanticipated consequences by use of technology (e.g.  dry/water
cooling technologies) due to nexus complexity. Nevertheless, the latter does not cancel
the need for more efficient and cost-effective technological solutions that depend less
to water.
Finally, investments under the prism of nexus should be assessed by policy makers for
all technological solutions – even if not such popular today – taking in account water
constraints, climate and impact of climate change. In connection to latter, both more
accurate climate data and assessment tools for climate change impact are in need.
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